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A-Theoretic Change and the Lost Present

Date : 4 November 2024 (Monday)

Time : 16:30 – 18:00

Venue : WYL107 & Zoom Seminar

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The epistemic objection to belief in four-dimensionalist A-theory consists of two claims. First, if four-dimensionalist A-theory is true, then we cannot know that we're present (and we probably aren't). Second, it follows that belief in four-dimensionalist A-theory is implausible or, at the very least, unmotivated. The standard way to resist this objection is to argue that we can know that we're present even given four-dimensionalist A-theory. I explore the alternative: developing a version of four-dimensionalist A-theory according to which, first, we (probably) are not present (at least not in the relevant sense of 'present') but, second, we still have good reason to be A-theorists. I argue that, whether or not a view of this sort is true, reflection on where – if at all – such a view goes wrong reveals that the epistemic objection fails.

All are welcome

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